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The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for SecuritiesFraud Litigation
John M. Wunderlich*
The pleading burden that governs securities-fraud litigation is
significantly higher than those standards that govern traditional civil
cases. The heightened pleading burden applicable to securities cases
has transformed the motion to dismiss into something like summary
judgment. In fact, to contend with this heightened pleading burden,
plaintiffs typically must spend more time in the prefiling phase
gathering sufficient, reliable evidence of securities fraud.
With almost two decades of litigation under the securities laws’
heightened pleading burden, empirical studies are revealing that
certain kinds of evidence are more likely to defeat a motion to dismiss
than others. But dismissal statistics and cases are telling in another
respect as well. They reveal that some forms of corroboration (SEC
proceedings, accounting restatements, bankruptcies) seem more likely
to help stave off dismissal than others (insider trading, inferences from
shared experience, and accounts from confidential witnesses). This
issue—the effective strategies for investigating and pleading securitiesfraud claims—is the subject of this year’s conference sponsored by
Loyola University Chicago School of Law’s Institute for Investor
Protection.

* John M. Wunderlich is a litigator in the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, where he
practices securities, antitrust, and complex litigation. Additionally, John is the Institute Scholar
for the Institute of Investor Protection at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I thank the
participants of the Institute for Investor Protection’s 2013 Conference, in particular, Judge
Rebecca Pallmeyer, Professors Charles W. Murdock, Marc I. Steinberg, and Wendy Gerwick
Couture, and Marc I. Gross of Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP.
Additionally, I owe much to Dean Michael J. Kaufman of Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, Yelena Shagall of Katten Muchin Rosenman, and the editors of the Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal for their insightful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions in a securities-fraud case—
called by some the “main event”1—is how plausible is it that the
1. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs 1–2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-016 and N.Y.U. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1434561 (“The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud class
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plaintiffs’ allegations suggest fraud at the outset and not something
else? That main event is characterized by a heightened pleading burden,
no access to formal discovery, and an increased probability of sanctions
under Rule 11. That main event has made the prefiling phase—the time
when plaintiffs seek evidence to corroborate their allegations—much
more significant.
Whether the plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly suggest fraud largely
depends on whether they have found sufficient, reliable corroborative
evidence of their allegations in the prefiling phase. This may sound
intuitive as surely the more evidence to support a claim, the more reason
it has to progress through the screening phases of litigation. Empirical
studies and case law have begun to confirm that plaintiffs who have
gathered sufficient, reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud
in the prefiling phase are more likely to survive dismissal. But,
interestingly, dismissal statistics and case law also reveal that certain
forms of corroboration—certain kinds of evidence—appear more likely
to help stave off dismissal than others. That is, empirical studies and
case law have begun to clarify what kinds of evidence plaintiffs should
focus on in a prefiling investigation. This issue—the effective strategies
for investigating and pleading securities-fraud claims—is the subject of
this year’s conference sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School
of Law’s Institute for Investor Protection.
This Article is divided into two parts that track the argument above.
The first Part contends that the securities laws have moved the motion
to dismiss toward summary judgment, making plaintiffs more likely to
survive a motion to dismiss if they have first gathered sufficient,
reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud in the prefiling
phase. The second Part shows that some forms of corroboration (strong
forms) appear more likely to defeat a motion to dismiss than others
(weak forms). These strong forms of corroboration include Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proceedings, accounting
restatements, and a parallel bankruptcy. The weaker forms include
insider trading, inferences from shared experiences, and accounts from
confidential witnesses.

actions, effectively using the district courts as gatekeepers charged with screening out meritless
class actions at an early stage, while allowing meritorious actions to proceed.”); A.C. Pritchard &
Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 4 (Univ. Mich. John M. Olin Center for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 03-011, 2003), available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1018&context=law_econ_archive (characterizing the motion to dismiss as the “main
event”).
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I. THE SECURITIES LAWS ARE GOVERNED BY A PLEADING STANDARD
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THOSE STANDARDS GOVERNING
TRADITIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
The focus on the prefiling phase is the result of the pleading
standards and procedural rules that govern securities-fraud complaints.
These rules create access barriers that are significantly higher than those
that govern traditional civil cases.
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Represent the Predominant
Mechanism for Investors to Seek Recovery for Fraud
The predominant vehicle through which private investors seek relief
for fraud on the market is section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.2 This law forbids securities fraud in violation of the rules set
by the SEC.3 The SEC’s Rule 10b-5 prohibits fraud—by commission
or omission—in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.4
The predominance of this mechanism caused Chief Justice Rehnquist to
famously dub the 10b-5 action as “a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn.”5
But the judiciary has been careful not to make a federal case out of
every instance of corporate negligence6 or breach of fiduciary duty
where the conduct alleged is not manipulative or deceptive.7 Rather,
the Supreme Court has settled that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are
intent-based liability provisions.8 The level of intent required is called
“scienter” in securities lingo, and it signifies an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.9 According to every federal court of appeals,

2. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2012 YEAR IN REVIEW 6
(2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/Publication/dd449114-231a-43c5-af94341bb14bc830/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f96fd68-e318-41d2-b324-30cabf8c4d9d/
Cornerstone_Research_Securities_Class_Action_Filings_2012_YIR.pdf (finding that in 2012,
approximately 85% of securities-fraud complaints were Rule 10b-5 claims); ELLEN M. RYAN &
LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS:
2012 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 11 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com
/files/upload/Cornerstone_Research_2012_Settlements.pdf (finding that between 1996 and 2012,
there were 1306 securities-fraud settlements, and 997 of which involved only Rule 10b-5 claims).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); see also Facebook, Inc. v. Pac. Nw. Software, Inc., 640 F.3d
1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011).
5. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
6. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).
7. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478−79 (1977).
8. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94 (holding that allegations of scienter are necessary in
a private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
9. Id. at 193 n.12.
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scienter encompasses some form of recklessness as well.10
Recklessness is “a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely
simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is
so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”11
B. The Civil Rules Already Require Heightened Pleading for All Fraud
Claims
To craft an adequate securities-fraud complaint, plaintiffs must
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9, as well as the
pleading requirements and other standards of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).12
Rule 8 is the baseline. Its federal notice-pleading standard requires a
complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”13 According to the Supreme Court,
a complaint must plead sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”14 Determining whether a complaint meets this standard requires
that the court engage in a “context-specific” inquiry and “draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.”15 Generally, “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”16

10. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007).
11. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (internal
quotations omitted). Although the federal appellate courts have couched their recklessness
standards differently, the application among the circuit courts of appeals tends to converge on
whether there is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care presenting a danger of
misleading investors that is either known to the defendant or so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it. Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to
Deterrence of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1424–25; Ann
Morales Olazábal, The Search for “Middle Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
153, 162–64 (2001).
12. See, e.g., FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011)
(noting that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a claim brought under Rule 10b-5 must satisfy (1)
the federal notice pleading requirements; (2) the special fraud pleading requirements found in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), . . . and (3) the additional pleading requirements imposed
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995” (internal citation omitted)).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
15. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
16. Id. at 663.
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But cases of fraud present unique concerns, concerns that the drafters
of the Federal Rules accept as absent from other kinds of cases. First,
tarnishing someone’s reputation with an allegation of fraud is easy, so
easy, in fact, that plaintiffs may be tempted to bring bogus claims of
fraud and defendants may be pressured to settle these claims rather than
have their reputations publicly sullied.17 Second, “fraud” is such a
general category of misconduct that without particularized claims, the
defendant may not have adequate notice of the real claim at issue, and
the plaintiff may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss by generally
alleging fraud and then proceeding to discovery to attempt to uncover
whether fraud actually occurred.18
So, to discourage plaintiffs from filing meritless claims and to expose
to the public claims of fraud that have no basis, Rule 9(b) requires a
securities-fraud plaintiff to “state with particularity the circumstances
constituting [the fraud].”19 That is, investors have to plead the facts
surrounding the fraud in advance: “(1) specify the statements that the
plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state
where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the
statements were fraudulent.”20 But Rule 9(b) recognizes that our mindreading capabilities are non-existent, that actually describing a mental
state with precision is a trying feat, and that to come close to actually
doing so on paper would require a level of wordiness inconsistent with
Rule 8’s calling for short and plain statements.21 Thus, as a pleading
rule, plaintiffs may allege the defendant’s state of mind generally.22
Even with Rule 9(b)’s exception for state of mind, Rule 9(b) is still a
significant pleading burden, namely because there is no fraud by
hindsight.23 As explained by the Ninth Circuit in In re GlenFed, Inc.
Securities Litigation, there is no reason to assume that what is true at the
moment of the discovery of the alleged fraud was also true at the time

17. 5A CHARLES W. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
1296 (3d ed. 2013).
18. Id.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
20. See, e.g., Romach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
21. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1301.
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s
mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246,
1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating the rule does not require particularity in connection with the
condition of mind), superseded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
23. See, e.g., Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (“A statement
cannot be fraudulent if it did not affect an investment decision of the plaintiff.”); Denny v.
Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (requiring falsity at the time reports are issued).
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of the alleged misrepresentation.24 Indeed, between the time when a
firm announces something to public investors and the time some
sobering truth is revealed and the company’s stock price drops, any
number of events could have occurred that explain the difference
between an earlier, cheerier statement and a later, less-rosy picture.
Between an alleged misstatement and a drop in stock price, there may
be a general decline in the stock market, a specific decline in the market
for the defendant-firm’s industry, a shift in consumer demand, a new
competitor, a major lawsuit, an internal reevaluation of assets or
recalculation of loan-loss reserves, etc.25
The point is that the mere fact that an allegedly fraudulent statement
and a later statement are different does not mean that the earlier
statement was false. Thus, even though plaintiffs may allege the
defendant’s state of mind generally, to suggest any culpable state of
mind at all, plaintiffs must explain why the public statements were false
when made, which often (though not always) depends on a showing that
internal company information was inconsistent with contemporaneous
public statements.26
It is important to emphasize that this common-law rule for pleading
under Rule 9 developed in the shadow of plaintiffs’ access to such
internal information through discovery. 27 Plaintiffs had access to
internal company information through the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules, and if they did not have the requisite internal information
when they filed their complaint, they could revise and replead their

24. 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), superseded by statute, Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 737.
25. Id.; see also Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (“When the
purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not
the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken
separately or together account for some or all of that lower price. (The same is true in respect to a
claim that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been—a claim we do not
consider here.) Other things being equal, the longer the time between purchase and sale, the more
likely that this is so, i.e., the more likely that other factors caused the loss.”).
26. See, e.g., In re GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1548; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp Inc., 25
F.3d 1124, 1129–30 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint as insufficient to support an
inference of fraud when complaint did not demonstrate that defendant’s disclosures were
inconsistent with current data when made); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery
Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act
Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 547 (1998) (noting the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “Rule
9(b) . . . require[s] plaintiffs to plead with particularity contemporaneous facts, conditions, or
statements that tend[] to show the alleged misstatement when made” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
27. Sale, supra note 26, at 562.
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allegations soon after.28
C. Securities-Fraud Cases Require Heightened Pleading Above the
Heightened Pleading Under Rule 9
Despite the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9, Congress and
the judiciary believed that the concerns that justify heightened pleading
in the fraud context are amplified in the securities-fraud class-action
context. Congress and the judiciary feared that securities-fraud classaction plaintiffs compared to traditional fraud plaintiffs are even more
motivated to bring spurious claims and, in turn, defendants are even
more motivated to settle because damages are exponentially greater.29
In hearings to reform the securities-fraud class action, Congress
listened to testimony that securities cases had become lawyerly led
frivolous affairs in which counsel would file a suit on the hopes of an
easy pay off. And, in those cases, if the suit progressed to discovery,
plaintiffs’ attorneys would take up the company’s time and the time of
key management while they fished for viable fraud claims.30 So in
1995, Congress set out to reform securities-fraud litigation by enacting a
number of procedural barriers. These procedural barriers were designed
to reduce the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ role in securities cases, ensure that
plaintiffs diligently investigated claims before filing them, and provide
courts with tools to screen those securities cases that were clearly
meritless.
To achieve these ends, Congress demanded more specificity and
particularity in pleading—more than what was required under Rule
9(b).31
First, the PSLRA required that plaintiffs allege with
particularity each statement alleged to have been misleading and why it
was misleading.32
Second, the PSLRA modified the rules for pleading on information
28. Id. at 562–63.
29. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685; H.R.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736; see also
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (stating that “litigation under
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general”).
30. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4–5; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37.
31. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (Tellabs I), 437 F.3d 588, 594 (7th
Cir. 2006) (“Unlike a run-of-the-mill complaint, which will survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim so long as it is possible to hypothesize a set of facts, consistent with the
complaint, that would entitle the plaintiff to relief, . . . the PSLRA essentially returns the class of
cases it covers to a very specific version of fact pleading—one that exceeds even the particularity
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).” (internal citation and quotation omitted)),
vacated and remanded, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
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and belief. Normally, factual allegations may be based on information
and belief, and a complaint containing these allegations is appropriate
when the information is within the knowledge of the defendant, not the
plaintiff, or the belief is based on factual information that makes the
inference of culpability possible.33 The PSLRA required that if an
allegation is made on information and belief, then the plaintiff must
allege with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.34
Third, the PSLRA required plaintiffs to allege with particularity the
defendant’s state of mind.35 In the normal course, Rule 9(b) allows
plaintiffs to allege the defendant’s mental state generally.36 Yet under
the PSLRA, plaintiffs must allege the defendant’s mental state with
particularity.37 The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to allege the “who, what,
where, why, and when” surrounding the fraud and the defendant’s
mental state.38
Alleging facts from which a court must draw a strong inference of the
defendant’s mental state is a significant break from Rule 9(b). What
does it even mean to allege a “strong inference” of what is in someone
else’s head? Well, an “inference” is a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical conclusion from those
facts. So the question then is what “other” facts are considered and
when does an inference become “strong”? As framed by one court, the
inquiry devolves into “the degree of imagination courts can use in
divining whether a complaint creates a ‘strong inference.’”39 And one
securities litigator has written that “[j]udges have enough latitude under
the pleading standards to dismiss or not, in most cases. The pivotal
‘fact’ is . . . whether the judge feels the case is really a fraud case, or
not.”40
33. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The Twombly
plausibility standard, which applies to all civil actions, . . . does not prevent a plaintiff from
pleading facts alleged upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the
possession and control of the defendant, . . . or where the belief is based on factual information
that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)–(2).
35. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
38. See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009)
(explaining the PSLRA’s particularity requirement); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627
(2d Cir. 1990) (similar).
39. See, e.g., Tellabs I, 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded, 551 U.S.
308 (2007).
40. Douglas W. Greene, Falsity is Fundamental: The Case for Emphasizing Arguments
Against Falsity, D&O DISCOURSE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2013/10/07/
falsity-is-fundamental-the-case-for-emphasizing-arguments-against-falsity/.
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In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court
provided guidance on both questions—what “facts” are considered and
when is an inference “strong.” First, no longer would plaintiffs receive
the benefit of the doubt on a motion to dismiss. Rather, on a motion to
dismiss, while the court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, the court also must consider nonculpable or innocent
explanations one could draw from those facts.41 Second, an inference is
strong only when the culpable inference drawn from those facts is at
least as likely as the non-culpable explanation.42
There can be no question that this is a major change from noticepleading standards43 and that it has puzzled some judges. Judge Posner
raised this notion, remarking that for judges accustomed to notice
pleading, the drawing of strong inferences from factual allegations is
“mysterious”; even where Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead facts,
courts must treat those facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff.44
41. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23; see also In re Guidant Corp. Sec. Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913,
932 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (stating that “the [Tellabs] line of cases makes clear [that] we must consider
competing inferences arising from the facts as pled in order to determine whether [p]laintiffs have
created the requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter” (emphasis in original)).
42. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23.
43. Consider what Charles W. Wright and Arthur Miller have to say on the subject:
A proposition that is at the heart of the application of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and
one that is of universal acceptance, as evidenced by the myriad of illustrative cases
cited in the note below—drawn from throughout the federal court system, including the
Supreme Court—is that for purposes of the motion to dismiss, (1) the complaint is
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) its allegations are taken as
true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the pleading are drawn in
favor of the pleader.
5B CHARLES W. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357
(13th ed. 2013).
44. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir.
2008). According to some, Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal may have
heightened the pleading standard in traditional civil litigation to require this sort of PSLRAweighing process. See, e.g., Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, Twombly and Iqbal: The Introduction of a
Heightened Pleading Standard, 27 TOURO L. REV. 233, 240 (2011) (“Judges now must draw
inferences in favor of both sides. This balancing test requires the court to draw inferences on the
defense’s behalf, without the benefit of a defense pleading. The process, overall, has created a
new phenomenon: the motion to dismiss has become akin to summary judgment, while summary
judgment has become akin to a trial.” (internal citations omitted)); Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E.
Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2)
Plausibility Standard Converges With the Heightened Pleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) and
the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 (2010) (“By enhancing the basic pleading standard applicable in
every federal civil case, the Supreme Court has elevated the previously liberal Rule 8(a)(2)
pleading standard to approach the heightened pleading standards predicated on allegations of
fraud—the Rule 9(b) fraud pleading standard and the pleading standard for scienter in securities
fraud actions under the PSLRA. This evident convergence of pleading standards blurs the lines
between pleading doctrines that were adopted to address different policy concerns, thus creating a
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The effect of these pleading rules is that the motion to dismiss for
securities-fraud cases is summary-judgment like. For instance, the
balancing act required to determine a “strong inference” may have
caused judges to take a more liberal view of material properly subject to
judicial notice in a securities-fraud case. Professor Hilary Sale put it
best: “Since the PSLRA . . . the practice of incorporating documents has
expanded to include documents not signed or publicly filed by
defendants.”45 Additionally, some judges have described the PSLRA’s
pleading standard and the weighing of inferences as more akin to the
inquiry on summary judgment than the motion-to-dismiss standard.46
And some courts have even said that the standard for pleading scienter
is higher than the standard for proving scienter at summary judgment.47
And yet, the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements are not the
only changes that differentiate securities litigation from traditional civil
cases. Two other procedural changes amplify the importance of the
prefiling phase for securities cases. First, the plaintiffs must satisfy the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements while discovery is

federal civil litigation system that is unfair and incongruous.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New
Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (“The second similarity in the motion to dismiss and summary
judgment standards is that under both, while it appears that courts should view the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in assessing whether a claim is plausible, courts
assess both the inferences favoring the moving party and the inferences favoring the nonmoving
party.” (internal citations omitted)).
45. Hilary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 945 n.163 (2002)
(collecting cases).
46. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., dissenting)
(“It is also true, however, that there are social costs associated with a rule of pleading that causes
a proliferation of complaints that are chock full of allegations of detailed evidentiary matter. Not
only are such pleadings burdensome for defendants to deal with, they are burdensome for judges
who are required to comb through the evidentiary matter pleaded and struggle with the inferences
it does or does not support as though the evidence were presented in affidavit form as required by
Rule 56 rather than merely alleged in a complaint. This is a difficult and time-consuming process
that judges must necessarily engage in at the summary judgment stage, but it is a wasteful use of
judicial resources to require judges to engage in the same process at the pleading stage.”).
47. See In re Novatel Wireless Sec. Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1017–18 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[A] private securities plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great detail, facts
that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious
misconduct. . . . But at summary judgment, the standard is less stringent—the PSLRA
requirement of pleading a ‘strong’ inference of scienter ‘puts securities fraud claims in the
interesting posture of requiring plaintiffs to plead more than they must prove at trial, where a
simple inference of scienter is sufficient to support a jury’s verdict.’ . . . The Ninth Circuit has
confirmed that the PSLRA did not alter the substantive requirements for scienter under § 10(b)
and that the standard on summary judgment or JMOL remains unaltered. . . . As long as a
reasonable jury could conclude that the danger of misleading investors was either ‘known’ or ‘so
obvious’ that defendants ‘must have been aware of it,’ a triable issue of fact exists.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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automatically stayed. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
discovery proceeds despite any motion to dismiss. 48 Although Rule 26
allows a party to ask the court to stay discovery pending a dispositive
motion, the court will stay discovery only if the moving party shows
“good cause” for doing so.49 But Congress believed that discovery was
employed abusively and that plaintiffs engaged in “fishing expeditions”
to uncover evidence to sustain already-filed claims.50 With the PSLRA,
Congress made automatic a stay of discovery pending any motion to
dismiss.51 The discovery stay compounds the effect of the heightenedpleading standard. Recall that the heightened pleading standard under
Rule 9(b) evolved to require pleadings based on internal information,
but now plaintiffs are faced with Rule 9(b)’s internal-information
standard and the heightened scienter standard without discovery.52
Second, Congress increased the probability that those who brought
meritless securities-fraud claims would risk monetary sanctions. Under
Rule 11, attorneys must, among other things, not present any filing for
an improper purpose (“such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation”); they must ensure that their
claims, defenses, and legal contentions are nonfrivolous; and they must
ensure that their factual contentions have evidentiary support. But Rule
11 does not mandate a judicial inquiry on compliance at the conclusion
of every case. Congress perceived that the current Rule-11 mechanism
was insufficient to deter the filing of frivolous suits. 53 To strengthen
Rule 11 in the private securities-litigation context, Congress, through
the PSLRA, required courts at final adjudication of the suit to include in
the record specific findings whether the parties and their attorneys
complied with Rule 11’s requirements.54 If the court determines that a
party did not comply with Rule 11, then the court is directed to impose
sanctions in accordance with the Rule.55

48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
50. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 14–15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693–94.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2012). The PSLRA does explicitly provide that during the stay a
party with actual notice of the allegations must treat all discoverable evidence within that party’s
control as if it were subject to a continuing request for production of documents under the Federal
Rules. The PSLRA does provide limited exceptions to the stay if the court finds that
particularized discovery is necessary to either (1) preserve evidence; or (2) prevent undue
prejudice to that party. Id.
52. See Sale, supra note 26, at 563–64.
53. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13–14.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c).
55. Id.
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Together, these rules—heightened pleading, the discovery stay, and
the mandatory Rule-11 inquiry—have transformed the motion to
dismiss into a significant barrier. Courts have called the 10b-5 motion
to dismiss an “acid test,”56 an “eye of a needle made smaller and
smaller over the years by judicial decree and congressional action,”57
and a return to “a ‘demurrer-like’ process that creates considerable
hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome before any discovery is
permitted.”58
D. This Heightened Pleading Has Made the Motion to Dismiss the
Main Event For Securities Cases
What’s the upshot of the PSLRA and Tellabs? First, plainly, motions
to dismiss are prominent in securities-fraud litigation. In virtually every
case (96%), defendants move to dismiss.59 Generally, the parties won’t
even discuss the possibility of settlement until the plaintiffs survive a
motion to dismiss.60
Second, now more than ten years out, we may safely conclude that
the PSLRA has increased the rate at which securities-fraud cases are
screened. NERA Economic Consulting has concluded that “[d]ismissal
rates have nearly doubled since the PSLRA. Dismissals accounted for
only 19.4% of dispositions for cases filed between 1991 and 1995.
More recently, for cases filed between 2000 and 2004, dismissals have
accounted for 38.2% of dispositions.”61 Numerous other studies
56. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
57. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam with O’Connor, J., sitting by special designation).
58. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-civ-5026, 2013
WL 3389473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013).
59. DR. RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-YEAR REVIEW: SETTLEMENTS UP;
ATTORNEYS’ FEES DOWN 16 (2013) [hereinafter COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION], available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/
PUB_Year_End_Trends_01.2013.pdf. It’s worth noting that defense counsel at this Conference
stressed that defendants do not move to dismiss arbitrarily. Rather, defendants are keenly aware
that a weak motion to dismiss may damage the defendant’s credibility with the court.
60. According to a survey of in-depth interviews of securities litigators, “settlement
discussions almost never take place until after the motion [to dismiss] is filed, and . . . settlement
discussions typically do not take place until after the class action has survived the motion to
dismiss.” Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 775 (2009).
61. TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS PLUMMET SETTLEMENTS SOAR 4 (2007) (internal citations
omitted), available at http://www.mmc.com/knowledgecenter/BRO_Recent_Trends_SEC1288final.pdf. The report cautions, though, that the
post-PSLRA dismissal rate may be slightly overstated, as it may include some
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conclude that the PSLRA resulted in district courts granting an
increased percentage of motions to dismiss.62
One interesting recent trend is that in the past five years, the rate of
dismissals appears to be increasing. NERA Economic Consulting
concludes that “[d]ismissal rates appear to be rising. Almost all cases
filed from 2000 to 2006 have been resolved. Dismissal rates in those
years have progressively increased from 32% to 36% in 2000–2002 to
43% to 47% in 2004–2006.”63 And “[o]n a preliminary basis, it appears
that dismissal rates continued to increase in 2007 to 2009, as 44% to
49% of cases filed in those years have already been dismissed.”64
dismissals without prejudice that will be reversed by amended and better-pled
complaints or dismissals with prejudice that will be successfully appealed. There is no
indication that dismissal rates have continued to rise after an initial adjustment to the
tougher pleading provisions of PSLRA.
Id.
62. See FREDERICK DUNBAR ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS VI:
TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE IMPACT OF PSLRA 6 (1999) (observing that the
dismissal rate after the PSLRA increased from about 12% to between 25 and 28%); David M.
Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun
Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 39–40 (1998) (surveying 100 rulings on a
motion to dismiss during 1996 and 1997 and finding that more than half (60%) of those motions
were granted in some form: fifteen motions were granted with prejudice; thirty-four were granted
with leave to amend; and eleven were granted in part and denied in part); Richard H. Walker,
Introduction to the Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Symposium, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 447, 448–49 (1998) (observing that “it is not too soon to conclude that the Act is
having at least some bite at the federal level, making it tougher for plaintiffs to proceed. While
the Act has not chilled plaintiffs from filing suit, it apparently has made early dismissals more
commonplace. In the 280 class actions filed during 1996 and 1997, we are aware of sixty-three in
which there have been rulings on a motion to dismiss. In more than half of these cases, fifty-six
percent of the motions to dismiss have been granted in some form. By contrast, Congress heard
evidence that in 1992, only approximately forty percent of all federal securities class actions were
dismissed on a motion prior to trial. Available data shows that in 1990 and 1991, thirty-eight
percent of the cases filed by a leading plaintiff law firm were dismissed on motion.” (internal
citations omitted omitted)). I’ve been unable to locate any studies that attempt to measure
“shadow dismissals”—cases where in a pre-motion conference, the court provides direction to
plaintiff’s counsel to dismiss and re-file or dismisses from the bench entirely. See Jonathan K.
Youngwood, The Limits of Bright-Line Rules and the Challenges of Defending Clients in a
Constantly Changing Legal Environment, ASPATORE, Sept. 2012, available at 2012 WL
3279514, at *6–*7 (describing a shadow dismissal in a securities case).
63. COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, supra note
59, at 24 (internal citation omitted).
64. Id. Professor Steinberg notes that these dismissal rates are misleading in that they are
artificially low because, as a result of the PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s restrictive
interpretations on the scope of the securities laws, plaintiffs institute federal securities class
actions against fewer defendants than before the PSLRA. Marc. I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities
Fraud Claims—Only Part of the Story, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 607 (2014). Steinberg observes
that, as contrasted with yesteryear, federal securities class-action complaints alleging fraud-based
violations typically name only: (1) key executive officers (such as the chief executive officer,
chief financial officer, and chief operating officer); (2) the chair of the board of directors; (3)
outside directors who serve on key committees (such as the audit or compensation committee)
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Cornerstone Research likewise concludes that “for filings in cohort
years 2008 through 2010, a larger percentage of cases were dismissed
than in prior years. For filings in the 2008 cohort, 50% have already
been dismissed. For the 2009 and 2010 filing cohorts, dismissals
increased to 53% and 56% respectively. These percentages are likely to
increase in the future as ongoing cases are resolved.”65
Whether this increased dismissal rate is related to Tellabs or the
Supreme Court’s other recent securities-fraud decisions66 has not yet
been the subject of empirical study. In an informal survey of district
court decisions in the months after Tellabs, however, Harold S.
Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff found that for cases resolving motions
to dismiss and citing Tellabs, 65% of those motions were granted.67
The authors are careful not to read too much into their findings,
however, as the sample was limited and they did not compare dismissals
with a cross section of PSLRA cases decided pre-Tellabs.68 So we too
take these findings for anecdotal evidence, but not hard science.
Interestingly, a recent paper by Professors Stephen Choi and Adam
Pritchard concludes that Tellabs is having some effect, namely unifying
whose alleged misconduct while serving as a committee member caused the improprieties; (4) the
auditors; and (5) perhaps the underwriters. Whereas collateral actors—including attorneys,
accountants (who have not certified financial statements), commercial and investment bankers
(and their representatives), and consultants—are named as defendants in these class actions on
relatively rare occasions.
65. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2013 MID-YEAR
ASSESSMENT 15 (2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/07ff7c1f-b775417c-9d6c-59cba194cb75/Securities-Class-Action-Filings%e2%80%942013-Mid-YearAsse.aspx.
66. Supreme Court decisions since 2005 that further narrowed the scope of 10b-5 liability
might explain the uptick in dismissals. In 2005, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the
Court said that 10b-5 does not “provide investors with broad insurance against market losses,”
and held that plaintiffs could not plead or prove loss causation by alleging just artificial inflation.
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). One study found that Dura resulted in a decreased number of class
actions being filed, but did not assess the decisions’ effect on dismissal rates. Scotland M.
Duncan, Note, Dura’s Effect on Securities Class Actions, 27 J.L. & COM. 137 (2008). In 2008, in
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court said that “[o]verseas firms
with no exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business here,” and then
rejected the notion of scheme liability for private actions under Rule 10b-5. 552 U.S. 148, 164
(2008). Then, in 2010, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Court said that “some fear
that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyers
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets,” and then foreclosed any
private 10b-5 remedy for securities transactions that occurred outside the United States. 130 S.
Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). In 2011 in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, the Court
said that the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 must be given a “narrow scope” and then limited
the Rule 10b-5 remedy to only those who “ultimately ha[ve] authority over a false statement.”
131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011).
67. 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 29:62,
at 454 (2013 ed.).
68. Id.
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the pleading standard. They studied a sample of securities-fraud class
actions filed between 2003 and 2007, and found that Tellabs correlates
with a lower dismissal rate on scienter grounds in the Ninth Circuit
(which had applied the most rigorous pleading standard before the
decision), but left, largely unaffected, dismissal rates in the other
circuits.69 Additionally, the authors found a decrease in low-value
settlements (which are generally associated with meritless or weak
claims) in those circuits applying moderate dismissal standards. 70 The
study did not measure, however, whether the total dismissal number
increased or decreased after Tellabs.
What element of a securities-fraud case is the focal point of a motion
to dismiss? Scienter. Professors Choi and Pritchard find that, in a
sample of securities-fraud class actions filed between 2003 and 2007,
scienter is the basis for dismissal (at least in part) more than 43% of the
time and that same argument is rejected in nearly a quarter of cases.71
Additionally, an analysis of thirty-six district court decisions from 2012
that dismissed securities-fraud claims found that in 72% of those
rulings, the court found scienter inadequate for the entire case, and that
in only marginally more cases (77%), the court found scienter
inadequate with respect to at least some claims.72
Materiality is also a common dismissal ground. According to
Professors Choi and Pritchard, district courts grant dismissal (at least in
part) in more than 10% of the cases for lack of materiality. 73 Others
find that materiality plays a more prominent role on motions to dismiss.
For instance, Professor David Hoffman analyzed 472 securities-fraud
decisions and found that 385 of them addressed materiality, and of
those, 44% dismissed at least one claim as immaterial as a matter of
law.74 Professors Stephen Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati likewise
surveyed motions to dismiss and found that more than 70% of their

69. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 852 (2012).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 862 tbl.3. One caveat is that there is no indication that this study accounted for
“elemental bleed”—considerations that are supposed to drive a court in deciding a single, isolated
element also cloud evaluation of other unrelated elements. Credit is owed to Professor Geoffrey
C. Rapp for the term. See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Rewiring the DNA of Securities Fraud Litigation:
Amgen’s Missed Opportunity, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1475, 1479 (2013).
72. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Falsity-Scienter Inference, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 303, 304
(2012).
73. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 69, at 862 tbl.3.
74. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537,
563–64 (2006).
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sample involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants.75
The prominence of these two elements in dismissal rates is consistent
with the idea that the motion to dismiss is more akin to summary
judgment. The Supreme Court has described one of these elements—
materiality—as a quintessential jury question because it requires
“delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those
inferences to him.”76 Likewise, the other element—scienter—has been
described by the Court as normally a “matter of inference from
circumstantial evidence,” evidence that by definition lends itself to two
reasonable conclusions from the same facts.77
II. TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SECURITIES LAWS’ HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF
COMPLAINTS, PLAINTIFFS MUST SPEND MORE TIME IN THE PREFILING
PHASE FINDING SUFFICIENT, RELIABLE CORROBORATION OF THEIR
ALLEGATIONS
The reforms by the PSLRA and the standard in Tellabs encourage
plaintiffs to spend more time gathering facts in the prefiling phase to
corroborate the allegations in their complaints.78 Securities-fraud
complaints that contain reliable corroboration of their allegations are
more likely to survive dismissal.79 This seems rather intuitive. After
all, the more evidence of a claim, the more likely it should pass through
procedural screens. What is notable, however, is that empirical studies
and case law suggest that certain forms of corroboration appear stronger
than others, and these forms may not necessarily suggest an actual
fraud.

75. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY
L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002).
76. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
77. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 391 n.30 (1983).
78. See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-Civ-5026,
2013 WL 3389473, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013) (“As a combined result of pleading
requirements set forth in the [PSLRA] . . . and in recent Supreme Court decisions such as
[Tellabs], a securities class action cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless it provides
considerable factual detail supporting each of the essential elements of a securities fraud
claim. . . . While designed to give district courts a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to derail dubious
class action lawsuits at the outset, an unintended consequence has been to cause plaintiffs’
counsel to undertake surreptitious pre-pleading investigations designed to obtain ‘dirt’ from
dissatisfied corporate employees.”).
79. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1498 (2004) (“Lawsuits relating to more obvious indicia of fraud, such as accounting
restatements, are more prevalent in the post-PSLRA . . . time period.”).
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A. Potential Evidence of Corporate Fraud
At the threshold, securities fraud is concealment of the truth, and so,
by its nature, without discovery, these cases pose special challenges to
uncovering evidence to corroborate allegations.80 In securities-fraud
cases, discovery is stayed pending any motion to dismiss. 81 So what
kinds of corroboration are available?
A useful starting point is to consider who discloses corporate fraud.
When we do so, we find that there is no shortage of potential evidence
out there. A 2007 study by several academics examined which
mechanisms detect corporate fraud.82 They derived a sample of 216
cases of alleged corporate frauds and identified who was involved in the
fraud detection.83 They found that it takes “a village” to detect fraud,
and no single fraud detector dominates.84 They found that six different
sources accounted for at least 10% of the detections, but no single
source was responsible for more than 17% of detections.85 What
sources did the study identify? Employees—”the most important
external governance group with 17% of the cases”; media (13%); and
industry regulators (13%).86 The remaining sources include stock

80. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he real burden on most investors . . . is the
initial matter of discovering whether a violation of the securities laws occurred at all. This is
particularly the case for victims of the classic fraud-like case that often arises under § 10(b). . . .
The most extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the time allowed for
bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 Act.”); S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 9 (2002)
(stating that “the best cons are designed so that even after victims are cheated, they will not know
who cheated them, or how”).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). When Congress wrote that a stay applied to “all”
discovery upon “any” motion to dismiss, Congress meant “all” discovery upon “any” motion to
dismiss. That is, any defendant’s motion to dismiss will stay discovery entirely, not just as to that
defendant but even as to nonparties or potential defendants. See, e.g., In re Carnegie Int’l Corp.
Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679–80 (D. Md. 2000). Courts have held that even a
defendant’s suggestion that a motion to dismiss is coming is enough to stay discovery. See, e.g.,
In re Firstenergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 229 F.R.D. 541, 543–44 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“Although
FirstEnergy has not yet filed its motion to dismiss, it has advised the Court of its intent to do
so. . . . In such an instance, . . . the PSLRA’s discovery stay provision applies.”).
82. I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle On Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2213 (2010).
83. To be more precise, the authors gathered data on a sample of alleged frauds that took place
in U.S. companies with more than $750 million in assets between 1996 and 2004. Id. In their
sample, plaintiffs brought securities-fraud class actions against the companies under either the
1933 or 1934 Act between 1996 and 2004. Id. at 2217. The authors then screened the sample for
“frivolous” suits (dismissed cases or settled cases for an amount less than $3 million) to end up
with a sample of 216 cases of alleged corporate frauds. Id. at 2213, 2217.
84. Id. at 2224.
85. Id. at 2224–26.
86. Id. at 2226.
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analysts, auditors, the company’s clients or competitors, equity holders,
law firms, the SEC, and short sellers.87 A survey of in-depth interviews
with plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers likewise found that plaintiffs
learned of potential frauds from “former employees, disgruntled
investors, or referring attorneys who represent the prospective plaintiff
for other purposes, such as real estate transactions or estate planning.”88
Another useful starting point for potential sources is to consider what
events are considered consistent with fraud and to look for public
reports about those events. It’s been long accepted that parallel action
by the SEC, restatements of earnings, corporate bankruptcies, and
insider trading are considered consistent with allegations of fraud. 89
Parallel SEC Proceedings.
Parallel SEC investigations or
enforcement actions may suggest that a securities class action has merit.
The SEC is not motivated by large class-action fees, and as a
government agency, it has an air of credibility. Likewise, budget
constraints encourage the SEC to devote those limited resources to
cases that it judges to be strong.90 Courts have said that even a
corroborated SEC complaint may be strong evidence of the merit of the
plaintiffs’ case.91
87. Id. at 2225 tbl.2.
88. Baker & Griffith, supra note 60, at 770.
89. This list is not exclusive. For example, Professor Charles W. Murdock catalogues four
ways investors can acquire internal company information and not all of which overlap with those
described above: (1) a special study by the board of directors, (2) a bankruptcy report, (3) a
restatement of financial results, and (4) an informant from the company. Charles W. Murdock,
Why Not Tell the Truth?: Deceptive Practices and the Economic Meltdown, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
801, 831–32 (2010).
90. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Given the vast
resources of the federal government, it might seem that the government would rarely if ever be
seriously inconvenienced by being compelled to litigate in a district more convenient to the
defendant. But such a suggestion would be unrealistic. Federal agencies have limited resources,
and the SEC in particular is often outgunned by the affluent defendants that it sues. The SEC
cannot afford a regional office in every state.”).
91. See, e.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(holding that allegations of premature revenue recognition in violation of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) “combined with the other transactions detailed in the SEC
complaint, provide strong circumstantial evidence” that the defendant acted with scienter); City of
Painesville, Ohio v. First Montauk Fin. Corp., 178 F.R.D. 180, 185–90 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (finding
complaint met heightened pleading standard and noting that company previously disclosed an
SEC investigation and indictments); see also Hill v. State St. Corp., No. 09-CV-12146, 2011 WL
3420439, at *10 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2011) (“At this point—the pleading stage—I cannot ignore
that Plaintiffs’ complaint is buttressed by, among other things, allegations made by six
confidential sources and the booty from an [eighteen-month] investigation by the California
AG.”); cf. In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (allowing
plaintiffs to lift the automatic stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss was pending because
“[i]n this case, the SEC and NYSE investigated and are continuing to investigate the precise
schemes alleged by Lead Plaintiffs in the Complaint. As a result of those investigations,
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Earnings Restatements. A restatement of earnings by the company
may also corroborate the plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud. A restatement
is reliable in that the source of the restatement is the company itself, and
some believe restatements of revenue or income are akin to public
admissions that financial statements contained material misstatements
when made.92
Bankruptcy. Studies have confirmed that fraud on securities markets
is more likely to be committed by desperate agents who fear that they
are in the last period of employment than by those secure in their jobs
and with the financial position of the company.93 Additionally, the
materials generated from a corporate bankruptcy—such as pleadings,
transcripts, examiner reports, etc.—may provide a wealth of internal
information for plaintiffs.94
Insider Trading. Insider trading is a classic feature of securitiesfraud complaints. “For a spokesperson to cash in his own stock can . . .
be like a ship’s captain exiting into the safety of a lifeboat while
assuring the passengers that all is well.”95 By consulting publicly
available information, plaintiffs can find instances of corporate insiders
trading the company’s stock.96
But identifying corroborative evidence or events consistent with
fraud allegations is only half of the task. That corroborative evidence
and those events must provide reliable indicators of fraud in the eyes of
the district judge. Over the past decade or so, case law and empirical
studies have revealed that some of these forms of corroboration appear
more reliable than others. That is, some receive more favorable
treatment under the case law and appear more likely to survive
dismissal than others (I hedge by saying “appear” because I’m not
aware of any studies that compare the forms of corroboration head to
LaBranche [(the defendant)] has agreed to pay more than $63.5 million to settle the regulators’
claims.”).
92. Sherrie Raiken Savett, Plaintiffs’ Vision of Securities Litigation: Current Trends and
Strategies, SN084 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 375, 433 (2008).
93. Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 725–27; see also Mitu Gulati, When
Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim
Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694–95 (1999) (noting that when a manager perceives
himself to be in a final-period situation, he will no longer be disciplined by the fear of
reputational sanctions and may act entirely in his self-interest in order to obtain the maximum
private payoff before permanently departing from the managerial scene).
94. John M. Wunderlich, Bankruptcy’s Protection for Non-Debtors From Securities-Fraud
Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 375, 409 (2011).
95. In re Scholastic Corp., 252 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2001).
96. See, e.g., Malin v. XL Capital, 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 131–33 (D. Conn. 2007) (collecting
cases).
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head, and because I don’t mean to advocate a universal rule that one
form of corroboration will always be more reliable than another.). I’ve
shorthanded the forms of corroboration as either strong or weak. Strong
forms of corroboration include SEC actions, earnings restatements, and
bankruptcies. Weak forms of corroborative evidence include evidence
of insider trading, inferences we can draw from shared experience, and
accounts from confidential witnesses.
B. Strong Forms of Corroboration
Parallel SEC proceedings, accounting restatements, and a company’s
bankruptcy are strong forms of corroboration as empirical studies
suggest that allegations corroborated by these events are more likely to
survive dismissal.
1. SEC Proceedings
Empirical studies have found that the absence of SEC proceedings
exposes a complaint to an increased chance of dismissal. In a preTellabs study of initial public offerings from 1990 to 1999 involving
securities claims, Professor Choi found that claims lacking hardevidence of fraud—defined as an earnings restatement or SEC
investigation or enforcement action—faced a lower probability of suit
and a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement
in the post-PSLRA period.97 Professor Sale also found that of postPSLRA decisions on a motion to dismiss from 1996 to 2000, those
decisions in which the plaintiffs pleaded that the SEC investigated or
was investigating survived 71% of the time—a dismissal rate, she said,
that was about 20% higher than for claims without a similar
allegation.98 Similarly, in a research paper from several law professors
that studied securities settlements, the authors found that “[w]here the
SEC has filed a parallel enforcement action—based on the same
allegations made in a class action complaint—the class action was
dismissed in only 12% of cases.”99 A survey of in-depth litigator
interviews likewise concluded that the “sizzle” of an SEC
investigation—of “‘executives being led out of the office in
handcuffs’”—may make a plaintiff’s case more appealing to a judge or

97. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 598 (2007).
98. Sale, supra note 45, at 950 n.178.
99. Michael Klausner et al., When are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They
Settle, and For How Much?—An Update 6 (Stanford Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No.
445, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831.
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jury.100
Even though parallel SEC action may increase the odds a case has of
surviving dismissal, it is not always true that SEC complaints or
investigations evidence fraud. SEC complaints or investigations are just
collections of unproven and contested allegations. Thus, courts may
reject plaintiffs’ attempts to rely upon allegations drawn from SEC
complaints.101 Indeed, should a litigant rely solely on an SEC
complaint, courts have held that such conduct would warrant sanctions
for violating the Rule 11 duty to validate the truth and legal
reasonableness of papers filed with the court.102
The converse is true as well. Although parallel SEC action may
increase the likelihood a case has of surviving dismissal, it is not always
true that the absence of parallel SEC action evidences aboveboard
conduct. For instance, as a result of a 2003 study, some scholars have
concluded that private litigation fills an enforcement void created by the
SEC’s inherent limitations (i.e., budget restraints, political jockeying,
bureaucratic barriers, etc.).103 Indeed, the SEC appears to target smaller
firms while private suits focus on larger ones.104
2. Earnings Restatements
Other studies have similarly found that the absence of earnings
restatements hurts a case’s chances for surviving a motion to dismiss.
In a sample of 150 motion to dismiss decisions from the Second and
Ninth Circuits from 1996 to 2001, Professors Pritchard and Sale found
that cases with misstatements about revenue recognition, a restatement
of earnings, and other Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”) violations made dismissal less likely at least in the Second

100. Baker & Griffith, supra note 60, at 788–89 (citation omitted).
101. See, e.g., In re Connetics Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005–06 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (dismissing a complaint that relied solely on allegations found in SEC complaints); Geinko
v. Padda, No. 00-CV-5070, 2002 WL 276236, at *5–*7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2002) (rejecting a
complaint grounded merely on SEC allegations and lacking independent investigation).
102. In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005–06; Geinko, 2002 WL 276236, at *6; see
also In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10-CV-1735, 2011 WL 5101787, at *10 n.5 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 27, 2011) (noting that allegations from other complaints, which are unproven and
uncontested, do not amount to facts and therefore do not satisfy Rule 11’s pleading requirement).
103. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry,
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003) (finding that only 15% of settled securities class actions have a
parallel SEC action).
104. Id. at 777–78. A later 2005 study by those same authors found that the SEC was more
likely to target larger firms after the Enron debacle in 2001. See James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 901–02 (2005).
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Circuit.105 Similarly, Cornerstone Research finds that accounting
cases—those involving allegations that the company issued financial
statements inconsistent with GAAP, the fact most likely to lead to an
earnings restatement—”are less likely to be dismissed” than nonaccounting cases.106 For instance, Cornerstone found that in 2005, 36%
of accounting cases were dismissed, but 60% of non-accounting cases
were dismissed. And in 2006, 37% of accounting cases were dismissed
(with 7% still pending resolution), but 49% of non-accounting cases
were dismissed.107 And a 2002 study by Professors Marilyn Johnson,
Karen Nelson, and Adam Pritchard compared suits that resulted in
either dismissal or a low-value settlement ($2 million or less) with
higher-value settlements, and found that accounting restatements were
positively correlated with higher-value settlements.108 In addition,
several Stanford law professors that studied securities settlements
between 2006 and 2010 found that even “[l]eaving aside class actions
with parallel SEC actions, cases that involved restatements were
dismissed less frequently than cases that involve non-restatement
accounting issues, which in turn were dismissed less frequently than are
non-accounting cases.”109 Perhaps recognizing the increased likelihood
that these cases will survive, other studies have found that after the
PSLRA, plaintiffs brought an increased number of accounting-related
cases.110
Earnings restatements, too, are not necessarily indicative of fraud,
although studies suggest this fact will help a case survive dismissal.
Indeed, “[r]estatements of earnings are common.”111 So, they alone are
usually insufficient to suggest that the defendant acted with fraudulent
intent.112 Rather, the amount of a restatement must be large enough to

105. A.C. Pritchard & Hilary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions
to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125,
146 (2005).
106. ELAINE HARWOOD ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, WHAT MAKES SECURITIES
CLASS ACTIONS WITH ACCOUNTING ALLEGATIONS DIFFERENT? 1–2 (2011), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/c6b4254e-5ea4-4f02-8949-beeb7d304ae2/What-Ma
kes-Securities-Class-Actions-with-Accountin.aspx.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 646–47 (2007).
109. Klausner, supra note 99, at 6.
110. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 913, 930–33 [hereinafter Perino, Did the PSLRA Work?].
111. Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1989).
112. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In
general, the mere publication of a restatement is not enough to create a strong inference of
scienter.”).
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suggest that fraud was the case or a restatement must be coupled with
other evidence that suggests fraud.113
3. Corporate Bankruptcy
Likewise, the presence of a bankruptcy suggests that a 10b-5 case is
more likely to survive dismissal. In a 2013 study, Professor James J.
Park found that securities cases against bankrupt companies were
associated with more successful securities class actions and he suggests
that courts use the fact of a company’s bankruptcy to corroborate the
allegations of fraud.114 There’s also evidence that companies that settle
securities-fraud class actions are more likely to have liquidity problems
and file for bankruptcy.115
Nevertheless, Professor Park found no support for the hypothesis that
securities-fraud class actions against bankrupt companies are more
likely to have merit than securities class actions against non-bankruptcy
companies. Rather, he said, securities class actions against bankrupt
companies are perceived as having more merit than suits against nonbankrupt companies.116
***
Before moving to the weak forms of corroboration, there are two
aspects of this dynamic that should not escape notice. First, instances of
“strong” corroboration appear to be those least in need of a private,
supplemental cause of action. These sources are the SEC or the
company itself in cases of earnings’ restatements or a bankruptcy filing.
That is, these are cases in which the SEC is already pursuing fraud,117
113. See, e.g., In re Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 488–
89 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (collecting cases holding that “a large correction is some evidence of
scienter” and concluding that the size and nature of the restatement suggested that the restatement
was no mere error but the result of systemic accounting abuses); see also Baker & Griffith, supra
note 60, at 788 (“A plaintiffs’ lawyer explained, ‘You need sex appeal, you know. We used to
think that just a restatement case was great because it was [an] admission, but you need more than
just a restatement. You need a restatement and you need some benefit[, you need to show] that
somebody benefited by the wrong.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
114. James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV.
547, 577, 579–82 (2013).
115. See Lynn Bai et al., Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of
Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1912 & n.88
(2010) (acknowledging generally the liquidity problems that companies face after settlement).
116. Park, supra note 114, at 579–82.
117. Where there is already public enforcement of the securities laws, one may question the
necessity of additional private enforcement of the securities laws. Other laws, like the False
Claims Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, allow
public enforcement to supersede private enforcement. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (Fair
Labor Standards Act); id. § 626(c)(1) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 31 U.S.C. §§
3730(b)(1), (c)(1)–(2) (2012) (False Claims Act).
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cases in which the defendants have already announced to investors a
public mea culpa (an earnings restatement), and cases in which
investors aren’t likely to recover much anyway because of bankruptcy.
Second, plaintiffs can uncover strong forms of corroborative evidence
cheaply and quickly. SEC actions, announcements of earnings
restatements, and bankruptcies are all captured in public filings. The
ease with which plaintiffs can get a hold of these kinds of corroboration
may explain why after the PSLRA, securities-fraud cases were filed just
as quickly as before.118
C. Weak Forms of Corroboration
The SEC doesn’t sue in every case. Indeed, one of the premises of
the 10b-5 private action is that it acts as a necessary supplement to the
SEC’s enforcement power.119 Moreover, not every company goes
bankrupt. And for a company to out-and-out admit securities fraud is
rare as well. So, if plaintiffs have a fraud case apart from these sources,
then they must rely upon other evidence available at the prefiling phase.
These other forms, to name a few, include evidence of insider trading,
inferences from shared experience and common sense, and finally
internal company information obtained from private investigators or
former employees (i.e., confidential witnesses). I refer to these forms as
weak forms of corroboration because studies do not suggest that their
presence does much to prevent the dismissal of a securities-fraud case
or because case law is largely suspect of these sources as reliable
proxies for fraud.
1. Insider Trading
The increased prevalence of option-based compensation schemes
makes it easy to allege insider trading in virtually every case, which
means that incidents of insider trading are coincidental in about every
securities-fraud case. Thus, the case law uniformly holds that to suggest
fraud, insider trading must be “unusual and suspicious.”120 The bottom

118. See Perino, supra note 110, at 913 (finding that after the PSLRA, securities actions were
filed as quickly as they were before the Act’s passage).
119. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013)
(“Congress, the Executive Branch, and this Court, moreover, have recognized that meritorious
private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
120. See, e.g., Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 184 (4th Cir. 2007)
(quoting In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir. 2005); Ronconi v.
Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 435 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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line is that courts are becoming inoculated to these kinds of allegations
as suggestive of fraud.
According to Professor Sale,
[a]lthough trades are included in complaints in the hope that their
presence will decrease the likelihood of a successful motion to
dismiss, approximately 62% of the complaints containing such
allegations are dismissed. . . . [I]t is more difficult for the plaintiffs to
use stock trades, no matter how questionable, to meet the scienter
requirement, and, thereby, to survive a motion to dismiss.121

Other studies confirm Professor Sale’s conclusion that insider-trading
allegations don’t do much to bolster an inference of fraud. For
example, a 2002 study by Professors Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard
compared suits that resulted in either dismissal or a low-value
settlement with higher-value settlements, and found that insider-trading
allegations were positively related to a higher probability of highervalue settlements in the pre-PSLRA period, but not the post-PSLRA
period.122 Perhaps recognizing that insider-trading allegations are not
as compelling as plaintiffs would hope, the incidence of plaintiffs
alleging insider trading in securities-fraud complaints has trended
downward since 2005.123
2. Inferences from Shared Experience and Common Sense
Another way to bolster allegations of fraud is to ask judges to draw
on their experience and commonsense to infer fraud. Two of the ways
we see this play out in securities-fraud litigation is when plaintiffs
contend that a court may draw a strong inference of scienter based on
the defendant’s motive to commit fraud or because the subject of the
alleged fraud concerned one of the company’s core operations.
The likelihood that these kinds of allegations will or won’t stave off
dismissal has not been empirically studied. But the case law suggests
that these sorts of corroboration are weak. For instance, we can assume
that generally, everyone wants to stay employed,124 make their

121. Sale, supra note 45, at 925.
122. Johnson, supra note 108, at 646–47.
123. COMOLLI ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, supra
note 59, at 15.
124. See, e.g., Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
defendants had “ample motive” to mislead investors where, shortly before taking control, the
company had “fired its previous executive for failing to improve the company’s revenue,” and so
the defendants “had especial cause to think that they would lose their jobs if they failed to
produce results”); Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, 24 F.3d 357, 368 (1st Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the defendants were motivated to commit fraud “to save their salaries or jobs”).
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company profitable, increase financial compensation in some way, 125 or
portray their company and their work in a positive light.126 But, as
courts have been quick to point out, all corporate executives share these
general aspirations, so these motives make poor proxies for
distinguishing between culpable and nonculpable persons.127
Similarly, plaintiffs ask courts to infer that management knew about
fraud when that fraud concerns the company’s “core operations.”128
The inference stems from “two common-sense principles” that have
endured the PSLRA: first, it is reasonable to infer that when a situation
occurs within the business’ core operations, senior management is likely
aware of its existence and, second, it is reasonable to infer that senior
executives are aware of the scheme when the scheme is pervasive and
widespread within the company.129 Similar to asking a court to infer
motive based on shared experience or common sense, courts are
likewise reluctant to infer that management acted with fraudulent intent
where the only indicator is that the subject of the fraud concerns the
company’s core operations.130 Indeed, the case in which a court will
infer scienter based on the “core operations” inference alone is

125. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999); Stevens v.
InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 123 (D.D.C. 2009).
126. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Med. Grp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75
F.3d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that all companies desire to maintain high bond and credit
ratings).
127. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that motive
to increase stock value or compensation, standing alone, does not prove fraudulent intent);
Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 622 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that “assertions that a
corporate officer or director committed fraud in order to retain an executive position . . . simply
do not, in themselves, adequately plead motive”); see also In re Rigel Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
697 F.3d 869, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege motive to
commit fraud because “allegations of routine corporate objectives such as the desire to obtain
good financing and expand are not, without more, sufficient to allege scienter; to hold otherwise
would support a finding of scienter for any company that seeks to enhance its business
prospects”).
128. A variant of this is Professor Couture’s “falsity-scienter” inference, which posits that a
statement’s well-pleaded falsity gives rise to a strong inference that the speaker acted with
scienter. Her point is that there are some subjects (the speaker’s marital status, the speaker’s
name, etc.) that the speaker must know or would be reckless in not knowing, and so a false
statement about a subject of that kind must have been made with scienter. See Couture, supra
note 72 (noting that “a false statement about one’s marital status gives rise to a strong inference,
at the very least, of recklessness”).
129. City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 932, 949 (S.D.
Ind. 2005).
130. See generally Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers:
Inferring Scienter from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507
(2012) (surveying cases and explaining that courts are reluctant to infer scienter based on the
“core operations” inference alone).
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“exceedingly rare.”131
3. Confidential Witnesses
One of the most common ways in which plaintiffs seek to shore up
their allegations is by adding accounts from confidential witnesses.
Their accounts may go a long way to establishing scienter. To explain,
one way to show scienter is to allege that the defendant had access to
contemporary reports or data that contradicted the public statements.132
That is, plaintiffs may effectively demonstrate scienter by juxtaposing
what the firm and management told the investing public and what they
said internally—what was said internally did not match what was said to
the investing public.133 Employees account for a significant portion of
external mechanisms that detect corporate fraud.134 According to a
study by several academics, employees account for 17% of fraud
detection.135 That is, a significant source of fraud detection is the
company’s own current and former employees. And this makes sense:
former and current employees are primed to uncover facts concealed
from public investors because these employees enjoy inside status.136
Contrary to the other forms of prefiling investigation, obtaining
confidential-witness accounts is not cheap. Often, this kind of
discovery requires hiring private investigators. It also takes time to find
and make contact with these witnesses. And when an investigator or
plaintiffs’ attorney makes contact, there’s no guarantee that the witness
131. S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2008); accord In re
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
132. See, e.g., Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1230
(9th Cir. 2004) (“The most direct way to show both that a statement was false when made and
that the party making the statement knew that it was false is via contemporaneous reports or data,
available to the party, which contradict the statement.”); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he inference may arise where the complaint sufficiently alleges that the
defendants . . . knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements
were not accurate”).
133. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting
allegations of fraud where plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous
internal documents or data).
134. Dyck, supra note 82, at 2214.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 108–09
(2012) (“Even though outside interests—like market arbitrageurs, short sellers, and regulators—
may have reputational or financial incentives to seek out fraud, for such actors ‘detecting fraud is
like looking for a needle in a haystack.’ Insider-employee whistleblowers ‘clearly have the best
access to information,’ since ‘[f]ew, if any frauds can be committed without the knowledge and
often the support of several employees.’ Insiders often also have the technical skills to
comprehend the sometimes complex financial transactions that are at the core of many modern
instances of fraud.” (internal citations omitted)).
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will even talk with them (there can be no pay for testimony137) or tell
them the truth.138 Moreover, even if the witness does talk, there’s a risk
that the witness may later recant139 when confronted by a former
employer threatening legal action for breach of fiduciary, violation of a
confidentiality agreement, or computer fraud.
Even if investigators and attorneys obtain confidential witnesses’
accounts, the reliability of these sources’ accounts is hotly debated in
securities-fraud litigation. Anonymous employees don’t enjoy the
imprimatur of being a government agency or akin to an admission by
the defendant itself. They’re usually ex-employees. Their termination
or resignation (possibly under bad terms) may give these witnesses
reason to gripe, so courts are naturally suspicious of them.
“Snitch[es] . . . liars,”140 and axe-grinders;141 a “gimmick” for obtaining
costly discovery;142 gossip-regurgitators and innuendo-makers;143 not
“privy to the big picture;”144 and ultimately “not far above a false
witness,”145 are just a few of the phrases used by courts to describe
these sources.146

137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt.3 (1983) (“[I]t is not improper to pay a
witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert witness on terms permitted by law. The common
law rule in most jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for
testifying and that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.”).
138. Cf. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that one
of the reasons “why courts may be skeptical of confidential sources” is that “lying to the police or
to law enforcement in general will likely lead to much harsher consequences than lying to a
plaintiff’s attorney, so statements by confidential police informants may be more reliable than
conversations between plaintiffs’ attorneys and whistleblowers”).
139. See, e.g., City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 760–61 (7th Cir.
2013) (instance of confidential witness recanting); In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (same).
140. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 356
(2008) (quoting Judge Posner during the oral argument in Higginbotham where the panel stated
“having a confidential witness doesn’t strengthen the allegation . . . . Such a person can be any
kind of snitch, any kind of liar . . . [making] anonymous accusations against a company”).
141. See Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that
confidential sources may have “axes to grind”).
142. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 711 F.3d at 759.
143. See, e.g., In re Metawave Commc’ns. Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (“The Court must be able to tell whether a confidential witness is speaking
from personal knowledge, or merely regurgitating gossip and innuendo.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
144. Material Yard Workers Local 1175 Benefit Funds v. Men’s Wearhouse Inc., No. H-093265, 2011 WL 3059229, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2011).
145. Id.
146. The distrust of confidential witnesses in securities litigation is a not a view that is
uniformly held. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Imposing a
general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources serves no legitimate pleading purpose
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Plaintiffs must then persuade courts that these witnesses’ accounts
are trustworthy and reliable. This inquiry depends on whether the
witnesses’ job suggests that they were in a position to know the facts
they claim to know, whether they provided detailed information to
suggest they have actual knowledge, whether they supported their
allegations with other sources or documents, and whether multiple
sources across the company are consistent with the account.147 (It is
important to note that these are just factors to guide analysis, not control
it.148) Indeed, to ensure the reliability of these sources, there have been
instances where, before a motion to dismiss, a court allowed defendants
to depose these witnesses or the district judge reviewed plaintiffs’
attorneys’ investigator’s notes summarizing the witness interviews.149
Once confidential witnesses are shown to be reliable and if they
corroborate the plaintiffs’ story, then the case may have a better chance
of success.150 A 2011 informal survey of dismissal rulings in 10b-5
subprime securities litigation found that if confidential witnesses were
considered reliable sources—that is, described with sufficient
while it could deter informants from providing critical information to investigators in meritorious
cases or invite retaliation against them.”); In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 02-8088,
2006 WL 263631, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006) (stating in a securities-fraud case that
“[c]onfidential informants play a decidedly important role in many areas of public life”).
147. See, e.g., Tellabs II, 513 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the degree of detail
provided and corroboration by multiple sources supports drawing strong factual inferences from
confidential assertions); N.J. Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC, Inc., 537
F.3d 35, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (providing an analytical framework for determining the reliability of
confidential witnesses); see also In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating that “the number of different sources helps the complaint meet [the PSLRA’s pleading]
standard. Their consistent accounts reinforce one another and undermine any argument that the
complaint relies unduly on the stories of just one or two former employees, possibly
disgruntled.”).
148. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (Shedd, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “a personal aide or administrative assistant to the CEO could plausibly
overhear a pertinent piece of information that may later form the basis for a securities fraud
action, notwithstanding his job title”); Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private
Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J CORP. & FIN. L.
551, 561 (2007) (stating that “job titles may convey little about actual job duties, and formal job
duties may say little about whether an employee would have been privy to senior-level
communications evidencing actionable misconduct”).
149. See, e.g., Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin.
Corp., No. cv-10-2847, 2011 WL 4431154, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 7, 2011) (stating that the
court reviewed plaintiffs’ investigator’s notes in camera before crediting confidential-witness
allegations); Campo v. Sears Holdings, Corp., 635 F. Supp. 2d 323, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(ordering that defendants depose confidential witnesses to determine if they made statements
attributable to them in the complaint) aff’d, 371 F. App’x 212 (2d Cir. 2010).
150. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-227, 2013
WL 1149670, at *10 (D. Vt. Mar. 20, 2013) (recognizing that a “critical difference” between the
plaintiff’s allegations and allegations in another case that were deemed sufficient to allege a
strong inference of scienter was the “credibility of the confidential witnesses in the two cases”).
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particularity and satisfying some combination of the factors above—
then the complaint was likely to survive a motion to dismiss, but if
those witnesses were not reliable, then the case was likely to be
dismissed.151
***
I do not mean to say that it is always true that securities-fraud
complaints that are strongly corroborated will always survive dismissal,
or that securities-fraud complaints that are only somewhat corroborated
will always be dismissed. We need only consult a few examples to
know that that is not the case. For example, consider two appellate
court decisions after Tellabs where the allegations appeared strongly
corroborated, but resulted in dismissal.
First, in Konkol v. Diebold, Inc.,152 the plaintiffs alleged that a
voting-machine manufacturer—together with its senior managers—
schemed to inflate profits (and thereby its stock price) by booking
revenue for the sale of machines that did not comply with applicable
law. The plaintiffs put forth several ways in which its allegations of
fraud were corroborated, including, among other things, that the SEC
and Department of Justice investigated the company’s practices; that an
outside law firm warned that the machines’ purchasers would reject the
voting machines because they did not comply with the law; that some
defendants sold large amounts of the company’s stock only weeks after
false financial reports inflated the company’s shares to an all-time high;
and that confidential witnesses described the fraudulent scheme in detail
and claimed that high-level officers of the company were involved.153
According to the Sixth Circuit, these allegations were insufficient to
satisfy Tellabs.154
According to the court, the government
investigations could have resulted “from any number of causes” other
than stock fraud,155 the plaintiffs did not allege that the law-firm
warning made its way to top management,156 the plaintiffs did not
provide a meaningful trading history that would have put the stock sales
in context,157 and the confidential witnesses were described with too

151. Christopher J. Miller, Note, “Don’t Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis”: A Survey of
Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 310
(2011).
152. 590 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2009).
153. Id. at 395–404.
154. Id. at 405.
155. Id. at 402.
156. Id. at 403.
157. Id. at 399–400.
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little detail for the court to consider them reliable sources.158
Second, in Matrix Capital Management Fund, LP v. BearingPoint,
Inc.,159 the plaintiffs alleged that the management fund made numerous
fraudulent accounting disclosures over an extended period. The firm
allegedly went on an acquisition spree, buying several firms, including
several foreign firms with no obligation to adhere to the accounting
standards that applied to publicly traded companies. To corroborate
their claims, the plaintiffs observed that the company restated its
earnings, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and was investigated and
subpoenaed by the SEC.160 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
inference of scienter simply was not as compelling as the nonculpable
inferences that executives were overwhelmed or negligent.161 The court
said that the restatements were an honest attempt by management to get
a handle on its newly acquired foreign businesses and that the
government investigation was too speculative to add anything. 162 The
court did not address the weight to be afforded the defendant’s
bankruptcy.
Similarly, cases where the plaintiff’s allegations are not strongly
corroborated may still survive dismissal as well. In Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, the plaintiffs sued a manufacturer of a cold remedy
for allegedly misleading the public about the safety of the drug. 163
According to the plaintiffs, the company knew or should have known
that consumer reports and other accounts stating that the drug caused a
loss of smell would have been material to investors, and that the failure
to disclose this to investors would be to withhold information pertinent
to their investment decisions.164 That drug accounted for about 70% of
the company’s sales.165 The Supreme Court concluded that the
plaintiffs alleged scienter—not because of a parallel government action,
bankruptcy, restatement, insider trading, or confidential-witness
statement—but because of the inferences we could draw from our
shared experience based on the nature of the fraud alleged.166 The
plaintiffs alleged that the company received reports from doctors
claiming that some of their patients lost their sense of smell after using

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 398–99, 400–01.
Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 176–85.
Id. at 188–92.
Id. at 185.
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1324–25.
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the drug. Once the company learned that those doctors planned to
present their findings, the company prevented the doctors from
referencing the company’s drug in the presentation.167 Eventually, the
FDA and Good Morning America alerted the public to the drug’s risk of
loss of smell.168 After these warnings, the company issued a press
release that stated that the drug was safe and that two double-blind
studies found no link between loss of smell and use of the drug.169
According to the Supreme Court, two facts made the inference of
recklessness of intentional stock fraud at least as compelling as a
nonculpable inference because they suggested a cover-up: first, the
company prevented the doctor from referencing its drug. 170 Second, the
press release was misleading because, in fact, the company “had not
conducted any studies relating to anosmia [(loss of smell)],” and the
scientific evidence at the time was inconclusive.171
As another example, in Berson v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc.,
the plaintiffs alleged that a telecommunications company lied to the
public by counting government contracts as part of its backlog of
scheduled work when, in reality, the government issued stop-work
orders on those contracts.172 The company did not file for bankruptcy,
there was no SEC investigation, and the company did not announce a
restatement of its earnings. The fact that justified a strong inference of
scienter, according to the plaintiffs, was that the stop-work orders
accounted for millions of dollars of work, the loss of which resulted in
one of the company’s facilities becoming a ghost town.173 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that it would have been absurd to suggest that the
company’s executives were unaware of these stop-work orders because
these contracts represented significant revenue for the company.174
In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., the plaintiffs alleged
that a fiber-optic-cable manufacturer was touting demand for its product
and the potential for a new product when, in fact, demand was slipping,
the new product was still in development, and the new product wasn’t
being received well by the market.175 Like Berson, the company did
not file for bankruptcy, there was no SEC investigation, and the

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
527 F.3d 982, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 988 n.5.
Id. at 989.
Tellabs II, 513 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2008).

WUNDERLICH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

772

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:49 PM

[Vol. 45

company did not announce a restatement of its earnings. The plaintiffs
instead alleged that the product was the company’s flagship product and
twenty-six different confidential witnesses (each described with
particularity) said that inside the company, they knew sales were
dropping and the new product was not being received well. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that it was “exceedingly unlikely” that the
defendants did not act with scienter.176 The court explained that the
products at issue were the company’s “flagship product” and its
“heralded successor,” like “Windows XP and Vista are to Microsoft.”177
The idea that no member of the company’s senior management knew
about the demand problems with these products, the court said, “is very
hard to credit.”178
CONCLUSION
My point is that the securities laws have transformed the motion to
dismiss into something like summary judgment—the “put up or shut
up” moment in a lawsuit. This in turn means that plaintiffs are better
situated when faced with a motion to dismiss if they have gathered
sufficient, reliable evidence to corroborate allegations of fraud in the
prefiling phase. And dismissal statistics are bearing this fact out,
finding that those complaints with corroborated allegations are more
likely to survive dismissal. But dismissal statistics and cases are telling
in another respect as well.
They reveal that some forms of
corroboration—SEC proceedings, accounting restatements, and
bankruptcies—seem more likely to help stave off dismissal than
others—insider trading, inferences from shared experience, and
accounts from confidential witnesses.
To close, notice that as important as the prefiling phase now is, many
issues are still unexplored. Namely, how can plaintiffs effectively and
ethically gather evidence before filing a complaint? How much of that
evidence can plaintiffs get? And then, how can plaintiffs present that
evidence to the court in a manner that it generates a “cogent and
compelling” inference that the facts alleged amount to a potential fraud
and not mere negligence or indifference? This Conference marks the
beginning of the exploration of this phase.

176. Id. at 709. The confidential witnesses are described as “important sources for the
allegations not only of falsity but also of scienter.” Id. at 711.
177. Id. at 709.
178. Id.

